Canada's approach to monetary policy

The ultimate goal of Canadian monetary policy is maintaining a low, stable rate of inflation in order to foster efficient economic performance and a rising standard of living for Canadians. More specifically, the Bank of Canada aims to keep inflation inside a target range of 1 to 3 percent. This range, established jointly with the federal government, was first announced in 1991 and has been extended through the end of 2006. Over the medium term, the target applies to total CPI. The Bank also uses a core CPI measure as a guide to future inflation developments over the shorter term. The Bank of Canada's operational target is the overnight rate, which is set at the midpoint of a 50 basis point operating band.Monetary policy - Canada ; Bank of Canada ; Banks and banking, Central - Canada

Norway's approach to monetary policy

The goal of monetary policy as conducted by Norges Bank is to maintain low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy is explicitly defined in a consumer price inflation rate of approximately 2.5 percent over time. Norges Bank sets its interest rate instrument with a view to achieving the inflation target over a two-year horizon, and it will normally tolerate deviations of actual inflation from target that are not in excess of plus or minus 1 percentage point. In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties, and extraordinary temporary circumstances shall not be taken into account.Monetary policy - Norway ; Banks and banking, Central - Norway ; Norges Bank

Japan's approach to monetary policy

The goal of monetary policy as conducted by the Bank of Japan is to contribute to the sound development of the national economy through the pursuit of price stability. The objective of price stability, however, is not precisely defined as it has been for other central banks. Following the implementation of the new Bank of Japan Law in 1998, the monetary policy framework is characterized by central bank independence, the primacy of the price stability objective, instrument independence, and policy decisions made by a monetary policy committee with regular meetings and published minutes. At its meetings, the monetary policy committee discusses the economic and financial situation and then decides matters relating to monetary policy, including the following: the guideline for money market operations; the official discount rate; reserve requirements ratios; the Bank's view of economic and financial developments; and the types, terms, and conditions of bills and bonds used in money market operations.Monetary policy - Japan ; Bank of Japan ; Banks and banking, Central - Japan

Switzerland's approach to monetary policy

Monetary policy as conducted by the Swiss National Bank is aimed at maintaining price stability in the medium term. Between 1980 and 1999, the Bank used the seasonally adjusted monetary base as monetary target and as indicator. Given the continually distorted indicator value of the monetary base after 1996, the Bank fundamentally reviewed its modus operandi. As of the beginning of 2000, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) considers price stability to be achieved with an annual inflation (CPI) rate of less than 2 percent. The Bank bases its monetary policy decisions on a medium-term (three-year) inflation forecast. Despite similarities to inflation targeting, the new framework differs from it in one important respect, namely, it does not contain an institutional commitment to an inflation target as the overriding objective of monetary policy.Monetary policy - Switzerland ; Banks and banking, Central - Switzerland ; Swiss National Bank

Sweden's approach to monetary policy

The Sveriges Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, is an authority under the Riksdag (parliament) with responsibility for monetary policy. Its objectives are to maintain price stability and to promote a safe and efficient payment system. With the advent of the new regime, which went into effect in January 1999, the Riksdag appoints the Riksbank's Governing Council, which, in turn, appoints its Executive Board, including its Chairman, who serves as Governor of the Riksbank. A member of the Executive Board may not be a member of the Riksdag, a government minister, or an employee of the Government Office. Further, Executive Board members may not take or seek instructions with regard to monetary policy. Thus, the Executive Board has instrument, but not goal, independence.Sweden ; Monetary policy - Sweden ; Banks and banking, Central - Sweden

Australia's approach to monetary policy

According to Australia's Reserve Bank Act, the central bank's broad policy objectives include maintaining the stability of the currency, full employment, and the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia. In 1993 the Reserve Bank of Australia adopted a specific, and thus transparent, inflation target as its operating objective; it aims to keep overall inflation between 2 percent and 3 percent on average over the business cycle.Monetary policy - Australia ; Reserve Bank of Australia ; Banks and banking, Central - Australia

Tests of Equilibrium Macroeconomics Using Contemporaneous Monetary Data

This paper uses contemporaneous monetary data to carry out econometric tests of the "equilibrium" approach to modeling the relation between monetary disturbances and macroeconomic fluctuations. The theoretical analysis introduces into an equilibrium macroeconomic model the availability of preliminary data on current monetary aggregates and the process of accumulation of revised monetary data. The econometric analysis tests two hypotheses derived from this extended model. One hypothesis concerns the neutrality of perceived monetary policy. The other hypothesis concerns the nonneutrality of errors in preliminary monetary data. The econometric results imply rejection of both of these hypotheses. These tests provide strong evidence against the reality of the equilibrium approach.

Lessons for monetary policy: what should the consensus be?

This paper outlines important lessons for monetary policy. In particular, the role of inflation targeting, which was much acclaimed prior to the financial crisis and since then has not lost much of its endorsement, is critically reviewed. Ignoring the relation between monetary policy and asset prices, as is the case in this monetary policy approach, can lead to financial instability. In contrast, giving, inter alia, monetary factors a role in central banks’ policy decisions, as is done in the ECB’s encompassing approach, helps prevent these potentially harmful side effects and thus allows for fostering financial stability. Finally, this paper makes a case against increasing the central banks’ inflation target. JEL Classification: E44, E52, E58 Keywords: Inflation Targeting, Asset Prices, Financial Stability, EC

Does Monetary Policy Matter? Narrative Versus Structural Approaches

This paper compares results from the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (1989) to those from the structural approach regarding the effects of monetary policy on real output. The results from both approaches lead to the conclusions that monetary policy matters and that the effects build slowly following a monetary policy shock. The narrative approach, however, leads to larger and more persistent effects than does the structural approach. Reasons are advanced in the paper as to why this might be so.